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Out of ‘Site: Can Government Officials 
Block Their Constituents on Social Media? 
Lindsey Wilkerson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Social media has revolutionized the way people communicate and 
created new questions about what is considered free speech.  Part of this trend 
is how government officials – ranging from small town mayors to the 
President of the United States – are using social media websites like Facebook 
and Twitter.1  Many social media websites provide the ability for users to 
block others from seeing their posts, which can create controversy for 
government officials.2  If a government official blocks a constituent, courts 
usually examine whether the official was operating his or her social media 
account for either personal or governmental purposes.3  If the account was 
being used for the latter, there could be a First Amendment claim present.4  
This Note examines the divided views between courts on governmental 
 
*Bachelor of Journalism, University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019-2021.  
I am grateful to Professor Wells for her insight, guidance, and support during the 
writing of this summary, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing 
process. 
 1. See, e.g., Josh Seaver, Mayor, Belle Missouri, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/SeaverMayor2018/ [https://perma.cc/G9WX-E7BM] 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (showing the Facebook page of the mayor of Belle, 
Missouri); President Donald J. Trump, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/POTUS/ [https://perma.cc/2XJA-H4PR] (last visited Oct. 
12, 2019) (showing the Facebook page of the President of the United States, Donald 
J. Trump). 
 2. How to block accounts on Twitter, TWITTER (last visited Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts 
[https://perma.cc/QQ2V-QUUJ]; Unfriending or Blocking Someone,T FACEBOOK 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1000976436606344?helpref=hc_global_nav 
[https://perma.cc/2QXT-CPTV]. 
 3. See Campbell v. Reisch, 2019 WL 3856591, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 
2019) (holding a government official could not block a constituent from her Twitter 
page because it was a public forum). 
 4. Id. at *18. 
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officials’ use of the block function on their social media pages and how it 
could be considered viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment if 
the page is used for governmental purposes. 
Part II of this Note takes a look at the background of social media and 
how courts have adapted to its growth.  It also examines how government 
officials, in particular, have jumped on the bandwagon for social media usage 
in their political campaigns and day-to-day interactions with constituents.  
With this development, courts are figuring out how social media translates 
into the preexisting precedent on public forum doctrine.  Part III of this Note 
compares and contrasts various cases brought to courts in various jurisdictions 
regarding government officials’ social media usage.  Part IV breaks down the 
main arguments that are made in those cases and highlights the ones that 
should prevail in the modern age of social media usage and evolving First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Despite the new challenges in this area of law, 
courts have generally viewed these cases under the concept of a “designated” 
public forum and have found that government officials cannot block 
constituents on social media platforms.5 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Social media has become part of the everyday lives of many people 
across the United States, regardless of age, race, gender, income, or 
education.6  Because of this, courts have gradually seen more and more cases 
with its involvement.7  Subpart A generally describes the growth of social 
media and specifically discusses its function as a forum for online discourse.  
Subpart B discusses how speech on social media can be protected under the 
First Amendment in cases where the government is involved.  Subpart C dives 
further into how government officials tend to use social media for their own 
benefit.  Finally, Subpart D outlines how a First Amendment claim is 
generally formatted if a government official blocks a constituent from viewing 
and interacting with his or her social media page. 
 
 5. See Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
 6. See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/2CDC-GF23] (showing that social media use has steadily increased 
in the stated classifications). 
 7. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017). 
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A. Social Media in General and How It Works 
Over the past few decades, the Internet has become a prominent part of 
everyday life.8  Social media, in particular, has grown significantly.9  Some of 
the most widely-used social media platforms include Twitter and Facebook.10  
In 2019, Twitter had approximately 321 million monthly users,11 and 
Facebook had 2.41 billion.12  Both platforms allow “users to directly interact 
with each other.”13   
On Twitter, users can post their thoughts and opinions – commonly 
referred to as tweeting – and other users can reply to those tweets with their 
own opinions.14  When users reply to each other’s tweets, it creates a comment 
thread.15  A viewer of the comment thread can see replies to the original tweet 
directly below the tweet as well as second-level replies (replies to the replies 
of the original tweet).16  Users can also acknowledge other users’ tweets in 
two ways.  They can copy other users’ tweets onto their own profile – referred 
to as retweeting – or they can simply “like” the tweet to show “approval or 
acknowledgment” of the tweet.17  A user’s tweets and retweets are published 
on a “continuously–updated ‘timeline,’” or online profile, while their likes are 
listed on a separate page.18 
Facebook is similar, allowing users to “debate religion and politics with 
their friends and neighbors or share vacation photos.”19  There are two types 
of Facebook profiles that are commonly used.  Facebook is prominently used 
to have a personal profile, which is for “non-commercial use and represent[s] 
 
 8. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (citing Am. 
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996)) (“The Internet 
has experienced ‘extraordinary growth.’”). 
 9. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1732 (“Today, one of the most important places to 
exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social media. . .”). 
 10. While there are plenty of other social media platforms on the Internet, this 
article will focus primarily on Twitter and Facebook since most courts have only 
looked at those platforms in this area of law thus far. 
 11. Jacob Kastrenakes, Twitter keeps losing monthly users, so it’s going to stop 
sharing how many, THE VERGE (Feb 7, 2019, 7:55AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/7/18213567/twitter-to-stop-sharing-mau-as-users-
decline-q4-2018-earnings [https://perma.cc/2EYY-TYVL]. 
 12. Company Info, FACEBOOK (last visited Sept. 28, 2020), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/93MR-H7UY]. 
 13. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 
230 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 14. Let’s Go Twitter, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us/lets-go-
twitter.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6AC4-J7FS]. 
 15. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
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individual people.”20  Facebook also allows users to create a professional 
page, which “‘help[s] businesses, organizations, and brands share their stories 
and connect with people.’”21  At the time this Note was written, Facebook 
pages consisted of three columns.22  The left-most column included a title, 
picture, and navigation bar.23  The middle column was comparable to a Twitter 
user’s “timeline” in that it was “organized in reverse chronological order” and 
contained posts from the owner of the page and “comments by Facebook users 
on those posts.”24  Finally, the right-most column included information about 
the page, including contact information, how many likes the page has, and the 
page’s self-identified purpose.25  For many government officials using social 
media, the right-most column is what identified them as government 
officials.26 
Both Twitter and Facebook allow users to “block” other users from 
seeing their content.  “Block is a feature that helps . . . users in restricting 
specific accounts from contacting them, seeing their [posts], and following 
them.”27  On both Facebook and Twitter, if a user is blocked, he or she cannot 
see any content from the user that blocked him or her.28  This prevents the 
user from interacting with the user or the content.29  Blocking is not a 
permanent decision; both Twitter and Facebook allow users to change their 
minds and unblock a user if he or she desires.30  Blocked accounts are not 
notified that they have been blocked; however, on Twitter, if they attempt to 
visit the profile of the account that has blocked them, they will see a message 
that they have been blocked.31  Similarly, a blocked Facebook user could 
notice that they are no longer “friends” with the person that blocked them.32  
Also, on Twitter, the blocking function only works if the person who is 
blocked is actually logged into his or her Twitter account. 33  For example, if 
 
 20. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Jan. 9, 
2019). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 674. 
 26. Id. 
 27. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2. 
 28. Id.; Unfriending or Blocking Someone, supra note 2.  
 29. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2.  When a user is blocked, 
they are prevented from liking, retweeting, or replying to posts.  Id.  
 30. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2; Unfriending or Blocking 
Someone, supra note 2. 
 31. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2; Unfriending or Blocking 
Someone, supra note 2. 
 32. Unfriending or Blocking Someone, supra note 2. 
 33. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2. 
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a Twitter account is public, the user that was blocked could log out of his or 
her account and view the tweets anonymously.34 
B. Social Media, Government, and the First Amendment 
“Interactive social,” like Facebook and Twitter, “can foster citizens’ 
First Amendment rights to speak, receive information, associate with fellow 
citizens, and petition government for redress of grievances.”35  The United 
States Supreme Court has also suggested that social media is subject to First 
Amendment protection.36  This reasoning branches from the text of the First 
Amendment itself, in that “Congress shall make no law .  .  .  abridging the 
freedom of speech.”37  Notice that Congress is the subject of this provision; 
the First Amendment prevents government regulation of speech.38  It does not 
apply to private parties.39  Because of this, private citizens can block one 
another on social media platforms without violating the First Amendment.40 
First Amendment issues tend to arise when the government gets involved 
in the regulation of social media usage.41  Many government officials have 
made their own pages on social media to represent themselves and their 
respective governmental office.42  Specifically, many government officials 
use social media accounts to hear the thoughts and concerns of their 
constituents.43  This function of social media became so prominent that 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2011). 
 36. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017); see Reno v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Lata Nott, Is your speech protected by the First Amendment?, FREEDOM 
FORUM INSTITUTE (last visited Sept. 28, 2020), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/primers/basics/ 
[https://perma.cc/XJH5-6ADQ] (showing a primer on what the First Amendment 
protects). 
 40. See McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL 1098935, 
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (showing that a former mayor was a private citizen, so 
he could block other users as he wished). 
 41. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (“In sum, to foreclose access to 
social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise 
of First Amendment rights.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Senator Roy Blunt, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/SenatorBlunt/ [https://perma.cc/P35L-J97L] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2020); Cory Booker (@corybooker), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/corybooker [https://perma.cc/7UNS-NYMP] (last visited Sept. 28, 
2020). 
 43. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (“[U]sers can petition their elected 
representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.  Indeed, 
Governors in all 50 States and almost every Member of Congress have set up accounts 
for this purpose.”). 
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Facebook created a feature called “Town Hall” in 2017 that encouraged users 
to “find, follow[,] and contact their government officials” and “see a feed of 
what their government is posting on Facebook.”44  Courts have now 
recognized that the First Amendment can be implicated if government 
officials block people from viewing their social media pages.45 
There has been quite a bit of controversy concerning whether 
government officials can block users from seeing the content on their pages.46  
Some reports suggest this feature has already been commonly utilized by 
officials.47  Many legal scholars have since compared the blocking function 
on social media by government officials as a restraint on free speech in a 
virtual public forum.48  They argue that since the pages are operated for a 
governmental purpose, the officials should not be permitted to engage in 
viewpoint discrimination.49  Viewpoint discrimination can occur when speech 
is restricted based on a disagreement with “the speaker’s specific motivating 
ideology, opinion, or perspective.”50 
If a First Amendment claim is brought by a constituent who was blocked 
by a government official, two main doctrines are argued: the government 
speech doctrine and the public forum doctrine.  First, the government speech 
 
 44. What is Town Hall on Facebook?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/278545442575921?helpref=search&sr=1&query=to
wnhall [https://perma.cc/SQL7-C7CD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020). 
 45. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Robinson v. Hunt Cty., 
Texas, 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (May 16, 2019); Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v.  Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 46. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Can’t Block Critics From His Twitter 
Account, Appeals Court Rules, NEW YORK TIMES (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/politics/trump-twitter-first-
amendment.html [https://perma.cc/86ER-KPLK]. 
 47. Leora Smith & Derek Kravitz, Governors and Federal Agencies Are 
Blocking Nearly 1,300 Accounts on Facebook and Twitter, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 8, 
2017, 12:43 p.m. EST), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/governors-and-federal-agencies-are-blocking-
accounts-on-facebook-and-twitter [https://perma.cc/5NHS-K7P6]. 
 48. See, e.g., Jonathan Groffman, The Modern Public Square: Digital Viewpoint 
Discrimination in the Age of @realdonaldtrump, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 69, 90 (2018) (“Expanding the civil right of action in § 1983 of the US Code to 
include the official social media accounts of political officials in the definition of 
designated public forums would therefore help ensure an Internet free from censorship 
and also uphold the guarantees of the First Amendment.”); Kathleen McGarvey 
Hidy, Social Media Use and Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Judicial 
Tightrope Walk with Rights and Risks Hanging in the Balance, 102 MARQ. L. REV.  
1045, 1085 (2019) (“[V]iewpoint discrimination challenges move from the online 
arena into the judicial arena.  Courts grapple with applying First Amendment 
jurisprudence, established through United States Supreme Court precedent, to these 
viewpoint discrimination legal claims.”). 
 49. Groffman, supra note 48; McGarvey Hidy, supra note 48. 
 50. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 820 
(1995). 
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doctrine prevents speech made by the government from being subjected to the 
First Amendment.51  Following this, if a court finds that a government 
official’s social media page is a form of government speech, then a First 
Amendment claim would be barred.52  Recently established precedent 
indicates that courts generally find government officials’ tweets to be 
government speech, but the “interactive space”  below the posts, which are 
open for the public to comment and reply, are not.53  Second, a “public forum,” 
generally, is a place “devoted to assembly and debate.”54  To determine if 
private social media pages can foster public discourse with First Amendment 
protection, courts have extended the public forum doctrine to include the 
“interactive space” of government officials’ social media pages.55  However, 
there has been some frustration in applying the preexisting public forum 
analysis to government officials’ social media pages.56 
C. Analyzing this Issue as a First Amendment Claim 
As government officials ramped up their social media usage and started 
to block constituents, plaintiffs filed cases alleging First Amendment 
violations.57  Courts have had to interpret previous public forum doctrine to 
determine if it applies to social media pages.58  Courts in various jurisdictions 
have started the discussion by determining if the constituent’s speech was 
subject to First Amendment protection.59  Any private speech – including any 
form of expression – can be subject to First Amendment protection,60 and the 
First Amendment “generally prevents government from proscribing 
 
 51. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009); Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 239 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 52. Summun, 555 U.S. at 469; Knight, 928 F.3d at 239. 
 53. Knight, 928 F.3d at 233. 
 54. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 55. See e.g. Knight, 928 F.3d at 237; Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-
BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019). 
 56. Compare Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018) 
(holding that a government official could block a constituent from his Facebook page 
because it was not a public forum) with Campbell, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7 (holding 
a government official could not block a constituent from her Twitter page because it 
was a public forum). 
 57. E.g., Campbell, 2019 WL 3856591 at *7. 
 58. See, e.g., Knight, 928 F.3d at 236.  
 59. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 
3d 541, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).  The author of this 
Note declines to discuss the specific elements that must be shown to make a First 
Amendment claim, as that is not particularly germane to the analysis in this Note. 
 60. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (finding that flag 
burning is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (showing that children 
wearing black armbands constituted speech under the First Amendment). 
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speech.”61  The government should be hesitant to restrict private speech, with 
the exception of a few limited circumstances.62 
If the speech is protected speech, then the court looks at whether the 
speech was conducted within a public forum.63  To determine this, courts use 
a two-prong test, created by a combination of case law: (1) whether the forum 
was within “government control,”64 and (2) if the use of the forum was 
consistent with the “purpose, structure, and intended use of the space.”65  
Social media platforms are usually owned by private companies, which on the 
surface can seem unlikely to be considered public forums.66  However, “[j]ust 
as the government can rent a building to use as a forum for public debate and 
discussion, so, too, can it ‘rent’ a social media page for the promotion of 
public discussion.”67 
Once the court determines that the social media page is a public forum, 
it then has to decide what kind of public forum it is.68  There are three possible 
categories: traditional, designated, and nonpublic.69  For speech to receive the 
utmost protection under the First Amendment, it needs to fall within the 
traditional or designated categories.70  Social media pages do not fall in line 
with the types of places that have traditionally been held as public forums, 
such as public streets and parks..71  Government social media pages are 
generally thought to be either nonpublic or designated public forums.72  A 
nonpublic forum is public property that is not traditionally considered as a 
“forum for public communication” and has not been designated as such.73  
 
 61. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 62. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (holding that obscene 
speech is not subject to First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. State of New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that “fighting words” are not protected 
by the First Amendment). 
 63. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985). 
 64. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d 
Cir. 2019). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1996. 
 67. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1996. 
 68. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1996. 
 69. Campbell v. Reisch, No.  2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7 
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019). 
 70. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (In traditional public fora, “the rights of the state to limit expressive activity 
are sharply circumscribed.”  In designated public fora, “the Constitution forbids a state 
to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was 
not required to create the forum in the first place.”). 
 71. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985). 
 72. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018); 
Campbell, 2019 WL 3856591, at *6–7. 
 73. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
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Examples of a nonpublic forums are airport terminals,74 school mail 
facilities,75 and political debates on a state-owned television station.76 
A designated public forum, on the other hand, is created when the 
government uses property or a place that has not “traditionally been regarded 
as a public forum” but “is intentionally opened up for that purpose.”77  The 
Supreme Court has found that a university student organization’s religious 
newspaper and a municipal auditorium can be examples of  designated public 
forums.78  In a designated public forum, if a restriction on speech is 
challenged, then the government’s actions are subject to strict scrutiny 
reviewal.79  This means that once a government has “intentionally designated” 
a place as a public forum, “speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling 
governmental interest.”80  However, it seems like the government can close a 
designated public forum whenever it desires.81  It is important to note, 
however, that just because a private space has been designated as a public 
forum by the government, does not mean that speech must be completely 
unrestricted; rather, the government can monitor and restrict the forum as long 
as it is being viewpoint neutral and reasonable in doing so.82  If the court 
cannot find that the government purposely wanted to open up a space as a 
public forum or if “the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive 
activity,” then it will default to the space being a nonpublic forum.83  Courts 
have generally viewed nonpublic forums as the default category until 
determined otherwise; however, the line distinguishing the two categories can 
be “maddeningly slippery.”84 
Determining whether a space is a nonpublic forum or a designated public 
forum is murky territory and generally decided on a case-by-case basis.  By 
looking at surrounding facts and circumstances, courts must determine 
whether the government intentionally opened itself up for commentary in a 
nontraditional forum.85  However, because this is not a bright-line test, district 
 
 74. See Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 
(1992). 
 75. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 76. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998). 
 77. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). 
 78. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 
(1995); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975). 
 79. Ark. Educ. Television Co., 523 U.S. at 677; Price v. City of New York, No. 
15 CIV. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018). 
 80. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 800 (1985). 
 81. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) 
(“Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the 
facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional 
public forum.”). 
 82. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010). 
 83. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803. 
 84. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1989–1990. 
 85. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46). 
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courts have been thoroughly divided,86 and appellate courts have provided 
limited guidance.87 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
This Part examines how the addition of social media usage into the mix 
of already confusing public forum jurisprudence has created differing results 
in courts across the country in cases regarding government officials blocking 
constituents from their social media pages.  Subpart A looks exclusively at 
cases at the district court level while Subpart B analyzes how appellate courts 
have molded the holdings of these cases into something more uniform. 
A. Evolving District Courts 
Cases surrounding this issue started surfacing in district courts primarily 
after 2016,88 and initially, courts were hesitant to rule in favor of plaintiffs 
who claimed their First Amendment rights had been violated.89  For example, 
in several cases, courts dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for not showing that a 
government official had acted in an official capacity when they blocked 
constituents.90   
In German v. Eudaly, the plaintiff, German, was a politically active 
community member who frequently testified at city council meetings.91  After 
one meeting, Eudaly, the county commissioner, posted on her personal 
Facebook account that she was displeased with German’s comments at a 
recent council meeting.92  Eudaly blocked German from seeing her posts so 
German was not able to respond to Eudaly’s criticisms.93  German sued, 
claiming that Eudaly had violated her First Amendment rights when she 
blocked her on Facebook, but the court found differently.94  Because Eudaly 
 
 86. Compare Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018) 
(holding that a government official could block a constituent from his Facebook page 
because it was not a public forum) with Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 
2019 WL 3856591, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019) (holding a government official 
could not block a constituent from her Twitter page because it was a public forum). 
 87. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Robinson v. Hunt Cty., 
Texas, 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (May 16, 2019); Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 88. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16CV932 (JCC/IDD), 
2016 WL 4801617, at *7 (E.D. Va.  Sept. 14, 2016). 
 89. See, e.g., German v. Eudaly, No. 3:17-CV-2028-MO, 2018 WL 3212020, at 
*9 (D. Or. June 29, 2018); Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 
2018). 
 90. See, e.g., German, No. 3:17-CV-2028-MO, 2018 WL 3212020, at *9; 
Morgan, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1010. 
 91. German, 2018 WL 3212020, at *1. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. at *9. 
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blocked German from her “nonofficial Facebook account,” the court said 
German could not claim that her First Amendment rights had been violated.95 
Similarly, in Morgan v. Bevin, a group of plaintiffs sued the governor of 
Kentucky, claiming he had violated their First Amendment rights when he 
blocked them from his personal Facebook and Twitter pages.96  In the 
comment section of the governor’s posts on Facebook and in the replies to his 
tweets on Twitter, the plaintiffs criticized the governor on policy issues and 
personal controversies, like the governor’s allegedly “then-overdue property 
taxes.”97  The governor claimed that he blocked the plaintiffs because he 
thought they were “spamming” his page.98  The court found that the 
governor’s actions were justifiable because the “use of privately owned 
Facebook [p]age and Twitter pages is personal speech, and, because he is 
speaking on his own behalf, even on his own behalf as a public official, ‘the 
First Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-
established forums do not apply.’”99 
However, beginning in late 2018, some district courts started siding with 
plaintiffs.100  This transition initially started when a court in Maine declined 
to follow the “key pillars” of the Morgan court.101  In Leuthy v. LePage, two 
Maine residents sued the Governor of Maine, claiming that he violated their 
free speech by blocking their access to his public social media page and by 
deleting their comments from the page based on their viewpoints.102  The court 
found that the governor had made a clear distinction between his personal 
social media pages and those that were dedicated to his term as governor of 
the state.103  Since the governor blocked the Maine residents from viewing the 
social media page devoted to his role as governor, he had violated the 
residents’ right to free speech when he blocked them.104 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
also heard two separate cases concerning the constitutionality of government 
officials’ blocking behaviors in 2018.105  In both cases, the court ruled that the 
plaintiffs had proven that being blocked by a government official on social 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
 97. Id. at 1008. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1010–11 (quoting Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015)). 
 100. Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:17-CV-00296-JAW, 2018 WL 4134628, at *16 (D. 
Me. Aug. 29, 2018), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 1:17-CV-00296-JAW, 2018 
WL 4955194 (D.  Me.  Oct.  12, 2018); Price v. City of New York, No. 15 CIV. 5871 
(KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018). 
 101. Leuthy, 2018 WL 4134628, at *16. 
 102. Id. at *1. 
 103. Id. at *4. 
 104. Id. at *15. 
 105. See Price v. City of New York, No. 15 CIV. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507 
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
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media constituted a First Amendment violation.106  In Knight First 
Amendment Institute at Columbia University. v. Trump (Knight I), the court 
heard a case against President Donald J. Trump.107  A group of plaintiffs – 
Twitter users – sued the President after he blocked them from his personal 
Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, because of their political views.108  In 
its analysis, the court found that although the President uses an official Twitter 
account for his presidency (@POTUS), he also uses @realDonaldTrump for 
governmental purposes, so neither account can act in a viewpoint 
discriminatory manner.109  The court also found that the government can 
initially control the “interactive space” by controlling which users can reply 
or retweet tweets initially sent from the @realDonaldTrump account, but it 
cannot limit the “subsequent dialogue in the comment thread.”110  While the 
court acknowledged that blocking someone on Twitter does not fully prevent 
them from interacting with the President’s Twitter account,111 it found that the 
inconveniences caused by the President’s actions outweighed this workaround 
and blocking the plaintiffs still violated their First Amendment rights.112 
The court reached a similar decision in a distinguishable case, Price v. 
City of New York.113  In Price, the plaintiff approached the New York Police 
Department about being harassed and harmed by another resident.114  One 
way that the plaintiff communicated her concerns was by tweeting the police 
department on Twitter.115  The department blocked her, and she filed suit.116  
Price was decided about a month after Knight I, and the court acknowledged 
that Knight I had a discernable procedural posture and facts behind its 
claim.117 
First, Knight I stemmed from cross-motions of summary judgment, 
while Price examined a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.118  For a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, the court had to examine every “well-pleaded complaint” in 
Price’s complaint,119 while in Knight I, the court only had to evaluate whether 
each plaintiff asserted a “genuine issue of material fact” against the defendant 
 
 106. Price, 2018 WL 3117507, at *16; Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 107. 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549. 
 108. Id. at 553. 
 109. Id. at 576. 
 110. Id. at 570. 
 111. Id. at 554. 
 112. Id. at 580. 
 113. No. 15 CIV. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018). 
 114. Id. at *2. 
 115. Id. at *3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at *10. 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. at *11. 
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overall.120  Because of this, the court had to review several more hefty claims 
in Price than it had to consider in Knight I. 
Second, the facts behind Price were strikingly different.  In Price, the 
plaintiff was in an abusive relationship.121  Price received a restraining order 
against her abuser, but police officers refused to serve it on him and claimed 
she was a “fabricator.”122  Soon after, a stranger assaulted Price.123  When she 
went to police again, they refused to file a complaint.124  In response, Price 
complained on Twitter about the department, occasionally replying to its 
tweets directly.125  The department blocked her “shortly thereafter.”126  In 
comparison, the plaintiffs in Knight I claimed that the President had blocked 
them because “[t]hey each tweeted a message critical of the President or his 
policies in reply to a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account,” and they 
were blocked by the President “shortly thereafter.”127  Despite these factual 
and procedural differences, however, the court still came to a similar 
conclusion; Price’s replies were in the “interactive space” of the police 
department’s Twitter page, and she was removed from the designated public 
forum when the department blocked her.128 
B. Appellate Intervention 
While cases like Price and Knight I started the district courts’ discussion 
on these issues and reasoned that some plaintiffs had prevailing arguments in 
these cases,129 appellate interpretation really led the way for a transition in 
various district courts throughout the nation.130  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, found that the chair of a county 
board of commissioners engaged in viewpoint discrimination when she 
 
 120. Knight First Amendment Inst.  at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
541, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 121. Price, 2018 WL 3117507, at *1. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at *2. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at *3. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
541, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 128. Price, 2018 WL 3117507 at *16. 
 129. See Lauren Beausoleil, Is Trolling Trump A Right or A Privilege?: The 
Erroneous Finding in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. 
Trump, 60 B.C.L. REV. E-Supplement II.–31, II.–31 (2019) (arguing in the abstract, 
“Knight First Amendment Institute marks the first instance in which a court identified 
a public forum within a public official’s twitter account.”); David McGee, What 
Constitutes A Public Forum on Social Media?, Hum. Rts., 2018 (“The District Court, 
in a case of first impression, found Trump’s argument unpersuasive.”). 
 130. See, e.g., One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 955 (W.D. 
Wis. 2019); Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7 
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019). 
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blocked a constituent because the constituent’s speech was within the 
“interactive space” of the social media page and, therefore, in a public 
forum.131  In Davison v. Randall, the chairwoman, Randall, operated a 
Facebook page, where she frequently asked for public input and discussion.132  
Davison was a resident who frequently spoke up at town hall meetings about 
public school funding.133  Randall posted on Facebook after one of the 
meetings Davison had attended.134  Davison used his Facebook account to 
comment on the chairwoman’s Facebook post, and allegedly claimed that 
school board members had accepted “kickback money.”135  Randall blocked 
Davison’s account, but after a change of heart, unblocked him.136  The court 
found that the part of the Facebook page that Davison interacted with was a 
public forum.137  The court reasoned that “Randall also expressly opened the 
Chair’s Facebook Page’s middle column—its interactive space—for ‘ANY’ 
user to post on ‘ANY issues.’” 138  By this statement, the government – 
Randall – had intentionally opened up a designated public forum, and 
therefore, could not engage in viewpoint discrimination by blocking 
Davison.139  
Cases like Davison also appeared in Second and Fifth Circuits, and those 
courts held similarly.140  Knight I was appealed to the Second Circuit, which 
affirmed the district court’s decision in Knight II: “[T]he First Amendment 
does not permit a public official who utilizes a social media account for all 
manner of official purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise–open online 
dialogue because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.”141 
In Robinson v. Hunt County, Texas, the Fifth Circuit heard a case where 
a county sheriff’s office was under fire for blocking people from its Facebook 
 
 131. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 687 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 132. Id. at 674. 
 133. Id. at 675. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 676. 
 137. Id. at 688.   
 138. Id. at 687. 
 139. Id.  It is worth contrasting this result with another case that Davison brought 
against the county, this time suing a Commonwealth attorney.  In that case, the court 
found that Davison’s First Amendment rights had not been violated.  Davison’s 
comments could be deleted because the Loudoun County Social Media Comments 
Policy had outlined a purpose in “present[ing] matters of public interest in Loudoun 
County,” and therefore, deleting Davison’s comments was not viewpoint 
discriminatory.  Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 771 (E.D. Va. 
2017), aff’d, 715 F. App’x 298 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 140. Robinson v. Hunt Cty., Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 448 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g 
denied (May 16, 2019); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).  Throughout this Note, the appellate level of this case 
will be referred to in-text as Knight II. 
 141. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230. 
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page.142  The page’s description said the sheriff’s office welcomed public 
comment but specifically said, “please note that this is NOT a public 
forum.”143  The sheriff’s office posted on its page that “ANY post filled with 
foul language, hate speech of all types and comments that are considered 
inappropriate will be removed and the user banned.”144  Robinson and other 
Facebook users commented on the post and criticized the sheriff’s office for 
deleting comments and blocking users.145  The sheriff’s office blocked 
Robinson shortly after.146  The Fifth Circuit quickly concluded that the 
Facebook page was a “forum subject to First Amendment protection” because 
the sheriff’s office provided no evidence to the contrary – other than its brief 
statement on its Facebook page – and the district court below did not address 
the issue.147 
IV. DISCUSSION 
When deciding the constitutionality of public officials blocking 
constituents on social media platforms, there are two focal points where courts 
tend to diverge: (1) whether a public official uses his or her social media 
profiles for personal use or governmental use; and (2) what kind of public 
forum – if any – his or her social media pages can be.148 
A. Who Is Speaking and In What Capacity? 
Courts are correct in making the distinction between personal use and 
governmental use for public officials’ social media pages.  This analysis has 
been articulated in many of the courts’ analyses when it surfaces in their 
dockets.149  For example, the Second Circuit in Knight II  made clear that 
while President Trump’s Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, was 
ultimately used for governmental purposes, “[o]f course, not every social 
media account operated by a public official is a government account.”150 
The line between determining if an account is for governmental use or 
personal use is tricky.  On one hand, there are cases like Knight I and Knight 
II that found that President Trump’s Twitter account was governmental 
 
 142. Robinson, 921 F.3d at 445. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 448. 
 148. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.2d 
226, 231 (2d Cir. 2019); Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1005 (E.D. Ky. 
2018). 
 149. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 680 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Jan. 9, 
2019); Knight, 928 F.3d at 234–236; Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1011 
(E.D. Ky. 2018). 
 150. Knight, 928 F.3d at 236. 
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speech because the account “bear[ed] all the trappings of an official, state–run 
account.”151  In defense of this, the court acknowledged that the description 
of the page said it was registered to “45th President of the United States of 
America, Washington D.C.” and had a header photo showing the President 
conducting typical presidential activities like “signing executive orders, 
delivering remarks at the White House, and meeting with the Pope, heads of 
state, and other foreign dignitaries.”152 
On the other hand, this rationale was not enough for the Morgan court.153  
That court acknowledged that Kentucky Governor Bevin “maintains official 
Facebook and Twitter accounts” and cited the governor’s Twitter and 
Facebook pages.154  While the case was decided in 2018, Governor Bevin’s 
social media pages still tend to reflect President Trump’s in several ways.  The 
governor’s Twitter page has a Twitter header that labels him as the governor 
of Kentucky, and the page’s description also labels him as “Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky.”155  Still, the court was convinced that 
Governor Bevin was not attempting to control the speech of constituents by 
using his Twitter page, so the page was just personal speech and not subject 
to the First Amendment.156 
This back and forth line of reasoning is like walking a very wobbly tight-
rope; in determining whether a social media page is used for personal or 
official purposes, courts must evaluate each government official’s social 
media page on a case-by-case basis.  Questions are already beginning to arise 
with these distinctions.  What will happen in the next decade when young, 
fresh faces become public officials and their social media accounts that they 
have had since high school follow them to their new public office?  Does a 
personal, yet still public, social media account suddenly transition to a 
governmental account once they tweet that they are running for office?  At 
what point could a public official stand up and say that his or her account is 
no longer for governmental use and is now just for personal use?157  These 
 
 151. Id. at 231. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1003. 
 154. Id. at 1005. 
 155. Governor Matt Bevin, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/govmattbevin 
[https://perma.cc/YA3H-FPA3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). This information was 
true at the time of this Note’s writing.  
 156. Morgan, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1012. 
 157. President Barack Obama’s Twitter account, @BarackObama, could be one 
example of this in action.  @BarackObama was considered the President’s personal 
Twitter since he did not use it to conduct governmental business.  After he left office, 
his Twitter was not archived under the Presidental Records Act for this reason.  
Gabriel M. A. Elorreaga, Don’t Delete That Tweet: Federal and Presidential Records 
in the Age of Social Media, 50 ST. MARY’S L.J. 483, 510 (2019); Barack Obama, 
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/barackobama (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/YKB6-CPJU]. 
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questions are yet to be heard by courts, but some governmental offices have 
written up guidelines to help guide the transition process.158 
Despite these questions and concerns, it is still necessary to draw a line 
between these two different purposes of social media accounts.  Governmental 
officials are still people outside of their offices, and they are permitted to have 
a “private presence.”159  The problem that courts have faced in past cases is 
that public officials cannot take off “their ‘officialdom’ . . . upon going home 
for the evening,” so it can be extremely challenging to figure out on social 
media whether a government official’s online presence is meant for personal 
or official purposes.160  Regardless, officials still want the ability to connect 
with their close friends and family online without being subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny and should be able to engage in their own right to free 
speech.161 
B. Reformulating the Public Forum Analysis Brings New Tensions 
As discussed previously, there are three types of forums where people 
can speak: traditional, designated (also referred to as limited), and non-
public.162  In many court opinions, the court acknowledges all three categories 
and breaks down why a certain category applies – or fails to apply – to social 
media pages.163  Most frequently, courts have decided that by using the logic 
of the “interactive space” on social media pages, the pages should be 
considered a designated public forum.164   
The “interactive space” concept was developed in Knight I – and later 
affirmed in Knight II – to work around the barrier of the governmental speech 
doctrine.165  While the President’s tweets themselves were classified as 
governmental speech, the “interactive space” below the tweets – the replies 
 
 158. See AG, Governor reach Joint Memorandum of Understanding on social 
media, email use, THE MISSOURI TIMES (May 17, 2019), 
https://themissouritimes.com/ag-governor-reach-joint-memorandum-of-
understanding-on-social-media-email-use/ [https://perma.cc/S8BP-W2H8]. 
 159. Brian P. Kane, Social Media Is the New Town Square: The Difficulty in 
Blocking Access to Public Official Accounts, 60 ADVOCATE 31, 32 (2017). 
 160. Id. 
 161. CJ Griffin, The Legal Implications of Governmental Social Media Use, N.J. 
LAWYER 16, 20 (April 2019) (“While the official accounts would be subject to OPRA 
and the First Amendment, by keeping the two accounts separate government officials 
can ensure they have a place to engage in social networking with friends, family, and 
other personal contacts, and that their own free speech rights are protected there.”). 
 162. Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *6–7 
(Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019). 
 163. See, e.g., id. at *6–7; Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. 
Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 164. See, e.g., Campbell,  2019 WL 3856591 at *7–8; Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 
549. 
 165. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573; Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2019). 
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section – was found to be a designated public forum.166  In this decision, the 
court created the best of both worlds – a public official can still speak freely, 
as his or her speech is still considered governmental speech, and constituents 
are still able to interact with that speech and bring claims if the public official 
blocks them from being able to reply.167  This philosophy should be followed 
by other courts, as it allows for the governmental speech doctrine and the 
preexisting designated public forum doctrine to coexist.168 
But even before the idea of an “interactive space” was used, some 
scholars argued “government actors should be presumed to have created a 
designated public forum any time they establish a presence on an interactive 
social medium such as Facebook.”169  This idea is supported by the basic call-
to-action for many social networking sites and how public officials intend to 
use them.170  In several circumstances that have surfaced in cases so far, the 
public official has specifically stated that they wanted to use their official 
Facebook or Twitter pages to encourage discussion, and that has been a 
persuasive factor in the court’s determination of whether the page is a public 
forum or not.171  Conversely, in at least one case, when an official explicitly 
stated that he did not intend to create a public forum by creating the page, the 
court still classified it as a designated public forum anyway.172  
The majority of courts have correctly concluded that public officials’ 
social media pages can be designated public forums.173  However, some critics 
have argued that Twitter and other social media platforms should not be public 
 
 166. Knight, 928 F.3d at 234. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Many courts are already following suit.  See, e.g., Robinson v. Hunt Cty., 
Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 448 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (May 16, 2019); One 
Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 955 (W.D. Wis. 2019); Campbell, 
2019 WL 3856591 at *9. 
 169. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1979. 
 170. See Our Advocacy, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us/advocacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/CJT6-YG3S] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (“We advocate for free 
expression and protecting the health of the public conversation around the world.”); 
Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-
zuckerberg/bringing-the-world-closer-together/10154944663901634/ 
[https://perma.cc/B3WH-F2NR] (June 22, 2017) (“For the past 10 years, our mission 
has been to make the world more open and connected.”).  Mark Zuckerberg is the 
founder and CEO of Facebook, Inc. 
 171. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting the 
county commission chair whose official Facebook page was being questioned, “I 
really want to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, 
complement or just your thoughts.”).  But see Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 
1008 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (showing that, although “Governor Bevin states that he wants 
to hear from the public on Facebook and Twitter,” the court still found that the 
Governor’s page was a nonpublic forum). 
 172. Robinson, 921 F.3d at 445. 
 173. See, e.g., Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 
F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019); Davison, 912 F.3d at 687; Robinson, 921 F.3d at 448. 
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forums at all because they are privately-owned platforms.174  Some opinion 
articles want complete control in the hands of the corporations that own the 
social media platforms175 since they have their own private rules and 
regulations.176  Under this rationale, it would not matter if the user is the 
President or a resident of “Small Town USA”; any user could face 
consequences – like being blocked or banned from a page – if they violated 
the website’s terms and conditions.  Violating the terms and conditions would 
not necessarily mean the user was criticizing the government, although it 
could certainly include that.177  The span and scope of what websites’ terms 
and conditions can prohibit can be much broader since it is not limited by the 
First Amendment.178 
However, it is problematic to think social media can only be viewed as 
a private space since “the Supreme Court never has circumscribed forum 
analysis solely to government-owned property.”179  It is not uncommon for 
the government to use a private space, like a hotel conference room or the 
back room of a restaurant, to open itself up for public comment.180  When the 
government does this, the Supreme Court has found that the government 
availed itself in opening a public forum.181  Despite the Supreme Court’s 
precedent on public fora, critics still compare social media pages to various 
Supreme Court rulings showing that places like airports, broadcasted political 
debates on public television, and public school mail facilities were considered 
 
 174. Noah Feldman, Constitution Can’t Stop Trump From Blocking Tweets, 
BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2017, 11:39 AM CDT), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-06-07/constitution-can-t-stop-
trump-from-blocking-tweets [https://perma.cc/U4XP-YMGE] (“There’s no right to 
free speech on Twitter.  The only rule is that Twitter Inc. gets to decide who speaks 
and listens—which is its right under the First Amendment.  If Twitter wants to block 
Trump, it can.  If Trump wants to block followers, he can.”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/twitter-rules [https://perma.cc/YQ4B-JJUX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020); 
Facebook Terms and Policies, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies 
[https://perma.cc/DGB2-E4UV] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
 177. Feldman, supra note 174 (“Twitter can establish any rules it wants in its 
private domain.”). 
 178. Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-restricts-free-speech-
popular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.cc/DYU9-K3KL] (“[S]et aside the First 
Amendment’s speech rules in favor of new, more restrictive ones. Messages we might 
once have heard from a soapbox in the park . . . can be banished from social-media 
platforms.”). 
 179. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 180. Id. at 863. 
 181. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
788–89 (1985) (holding that a charity drive for federal employees was a public forum 
because governmental property ownership is not what the analysis should hinge on, 
but rather, the First Amendment “access sought by the speaker.”). 
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nonpublic forums rather than designated public forums.182  The difference 
between these cases and cases considering whether government officials’ 
social media pages are public forums is the nature of the surrounding 
circumstances.  For example, Justice O’Connor once wrote, “[T]he tradition 
of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been 
made available for speech activity.”183  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has 
enforced the idea that “social media users employ these websites to engage in 
a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as 
human thought.’”184 
By allowing public officials’ social media pages to be considered 
designated public forums, this ultimately creates First Amendment protections 
that are seemingly expected by users when they log-on to their social media 
accounts.185  When Facebook and Twitter’s missions seem to enforce the idea 
that free speech is encouraged,186 it seems contradictory to not allow this same 
purpose just because the page represents a government official.  Free speech 
often includes “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks 
on government and public officials,”187 and when governmental officials open 
social media pages welcoming commentary on their policy decisions, they 
must be ready to face the music.  And when doing so, they cannot engage in 
viewpoint discrimination by blocking users from dissenting thoughts 
underneath the government’s speech.188 
 
 182. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998) 
(holding that a televised debate on public television was a nonpublic forum, and the 
network could exercise “reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of its journalistic 
discretion”); Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 
(1992) (holding that airport terminals were nonpublic fora); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (holding that mailboxes in a public 
school were not a public forum). 
 183. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 680. 
 184. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (quoting 
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)). 
 185. The Court also noted that: 
 
[w]hile in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the 
most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of 
views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace . . . and social 
media in particular. Seven in ten American adults use at least one 
Internet social networking service. 
 
  Id. at 1735. 
 186. See Our Advocacy, supra note 170 (“We advocate for free expression and 
protecting the health of the public conversation around the world.”); Zuckerberg, 
supra note 170 (“For the past 10 years, our mission has been to make the world more 
open and connected.”). 
 187. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 188. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 
236 (2d Cir. 2019) 
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C. Loose Ends Still Need Tying Up 
Even after covering governmental speech and public forum doctrine, 
there are still several lingering concerns with deciding cases involving the 
constitutionality of government officials’ blocking activities.  First, there can 
be some ways to see a government official’s social media pages even if a user 
is blocked.189  Second, in making a decision, some courts have taken into 
consideration how much the user was excluded from the page.190  Finally, 
some scholars are concerned with how social media fits into the reviewal 
standards for a First Amendment claim, specifically in regards to designated 
public forums.191 
1. Workarounds 
While the Knight II decision seemed to be a guiding light for many 
courts, it still left plenty of wiggle room in its dicta.  For example, the court 
spent considerable time discussing how many “workarounds” there are to 
being blocked on social media.192  While the court ultimately decided that the 
inconvenience to users was enough to demonstrate that the plaintiffs were 
effectively pushed out of the public forum, there is no strong demonstration 
that neighboring courts would have to follow this rationale.193  A different 
court could believe that the inconvenience caused by being blocked on social 
media may not be enough to truly demonstrate viewpoint discrimination; for 
example, the government official could effectively argue that he or she 
blocked the user for a viewpoint-neutral reason.  If the official considered the 
speech to be “spam” or determined that the comment was not topical to the 
page’s purpose, blocking that user would be permitted under the current First 
Amendment jurisprudence.194 
 
 189. Id. at 232–33. 
 190. Id. at 231. 
 191. Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2156 (2009). 
 192. Specifically, the court mentioned that  
 
blocked users who wish to participate in the comment thread of a 
blocking user’s tweet could log out of their accounts, .  .  .  Blocked 
users could also create a new Twitter account.  Alternatively, 
blocked users could log out of their accounts, navigate to the 
blocking user’s timeline, take a screenshot of the blocking user’s 
tweet, then log back into their own accounts and post that 
screenshot along with their own commentary. 
 
  Knight, 928 F.3d at 232–33. 
 193. Id. at 240. 
 194. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 
(1985). 
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2. Does the Amount of Exclusion Matter? 
The Knight II court also considered how much the President excluded 
users from his social media page in making its decision.195  The court 
recognized that “The President’s tweets produce an extraordinarily high level 
of public engagement, typically generating thousands of replies, some of 
which, in turn, generate hundreds of thousands of additional replies.”196  After 
taking this into account, the court examined what kind of exclusion the 
President was engaging in: specific or generic.197  The court concluded that 
the President was excluding specific individuals from viewing his page 
because “[t]he President ha[d] not generally sought to limit who can follow 
the Account, nor has he sought to limit the kind of speech that users can post 
in reply to his tweets.”198  This analysis, in part, contributed to the court’s 
determination that there was viewpoint discrimination at play in the 
President’s decision to block only certain users from viewing his online 
profile.199 
Using this standard in practice could be problematic.  If courts consider 
how much engagement a public official’s social media page fosters, that could 
be troubling for cases where the public official is less prominent, like a small-
town mayor or a county commissioner.  The smaller the audience the official’s 
social media page reaches, the more likely that courts would find that the 
official only intended the page to be for their personal use rather than 
governmental use, and therefore, not subject to a First Amendment claim.200  
In practice, this idea could be compared to the “public figure” analysis within 
First Amendment law.  A public figure has been defined as someone who has 
“thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies” and 
“invite[d] attention and comment.”201  The more fame and notoriety a 
government official has, the more likely the court will find that his or her 
social media pages garner “attention and comment” because it is clearer that 
they have “thrust themselves to the forefront” of public discussion.202  Vice 
versa, it may be more difficult to determine if a lesser-known politician truly 
 
 195. Knight, 928 F.3d at 231. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 239. 
 200. See generally McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL 
1098935, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (acknowledging that a former mayor’s 
Facebook page was for personal use only, despite allegations that the personal 
Facebook page was used “in order to communicate with the public about official City 
matters.”); German v. Eudaly, No. 3:17-CV-2028-MO, 2018 WL 3212020, at *6 (D. 
Or. June 29, 2018) (holding that a county commissioner’s Facebook page was for 
solely personal use, so she could block a constituent without First Amendment 
retaliation). 
 201. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
 202. Id. 
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meant to “thrust themselves to the forefront” of public discussion by having a 
social media account if his or her posts do not spark much engagement.203  
While public figure jurisprudence is interesting to consider with this topic, no 
courts have used it yet in their analyses of whether government officials can 
block constituents on their social media platforms. 
3. Murky Reviewal Standards in Public Forum Doctrine 
Lastly, there is some scholarly debate over what reviewal standard 
should be used when the government allegedly removes someone from a 
designated public forum improperly.204  The Supreme Court has puzzlingly 
set a conflicting test for this issue.205  On one hand, a state can only exclude 
speech in a designated public forum if it is “reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum.”206  But simultaneously, the Court has demanded a 
stronger test: strict scrutiny.207  Strict scrutiny already requires two elements 
to be satisfied; the government’s restrictions must (1) be “narrowly tailored,” 
and (2) “serve a compelling government interest.”208  Scholars have argued 
that the merging of these two standards together creates a “confusing and 
unnecessary” analysis for lower courts.209  And as the public forum doctrine 
has to adapt to the new world of online social media, “the need for a flexible 
and finely tuned doctrine to balance free expression with the government’s 
reasonable need to regulate becomes even more pressing.”210  Instead of 
having this complex analysis, it would be much easier for courts to analyze 
these cases under the ordinary prongs of strict scrutiny review, without having 
to consider whether it was “reasonable.”  Using this, the governmental 
restrictions would only need to be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling 
government interest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This is just the beginning of a discussion that will be tweeted, posted, 
and shared for years to come.211  As more people create social media accounts 
– whether those people are government officials or constituents – more cases 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009). 
 206. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 207. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998). 
 208. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. 
 209. Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, supra note 191, at 2156. 
 210. Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, supra note 191, at 2141. 
 211. Some of these cases may not even reach the courts. See e.g. John Bowden, 
Ocasio-Cortez apologizes for blocking ex-politician on Twitter, settles lawsuit (Nov. 
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will be brought by plaintiffs who believe their First Amendment rights have 
been violated.212  Unfortunately for lower courts and the government officials 
residing in their jurisdictions, there is currently no sure-fire way to decide 
these cases yet.213  In the words of one court, “The constitutional limitations 
and the current state of the law, as applied to state actors using social media 
forums, are in flux, significantly impacted by rapid technological 
developments and a lagging legal framework to address those technological 
changes.”214  Courts are making steps in the right direction by finding that 
public officials’ social media pages can be public forums.  However, any 
jurisprudence applied to social media will never be fully concrete.215  Despite 
this, progress can still be made, and there needs to be a more straight-forward 
methodology that ensures constituents’ First Amendment rights are protected 
when interacting with government officials online. 
 
 
 212. See, e.g., Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, 
at *9 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019) (notice of appeal filed in the Eighth Circuit).  These 
future cases will not be limited to just Facebook and Twitter.  Other social media 
platforms like Reddit, YouTube, and Tumblr might also be part of this future 
discussion.  However, the analyses will likely be similar to those considering 
Facebook and Twitter because all of these social media platforms use “interactive 
spaces.” 
 213. Know Your Rights: Social Media Blocking by Public Officials, ACLU 
MASSACHUSETTS, https://www.aclum.org/en/know-your-rights/know-your-rights-
social-media-blocking-public-officials [https://perma.cc/32FT-G8ES] (last visited 
Sep. 30, 2020). 
 214. McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL 1098935, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019). 
 215. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (“The forces and 
directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must 
be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”). 
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